In this #DefineStrategy entry, Philip Dolitsky provides his observations on Colin S. Gray's definition, contrasted with comments from Hew Strachan on Clausewitz. "Strategy is the employment of force and the threat of force in a dialectical battle with an adversary to compel the enemy to do our will for the ultimate purpose of securing a … Continue reading #DefineStrategy. Coloring In the Gray Zones: On Colin S. Gray’s Definition of Strategy
“But why, some say, the moon?”[1] While definitions of strategy vary, few question the value of a strategy to provide a ‘big idea’ and a sense of how an organisation can work towards an aspirational goal. As big ideas go, the President Kennedy’s 1961 proposal that the US commit ‘before this decade is out, of … Continue reading Project Apollo and Strategy as a Conversation
The closer you look at Information Operations (IO), the harder it becomes to define. Indeed, so too does the broader information instrument of national power; a component of the ‘DIME’[1] model, as well as many other models used to understand national power. The perceived complexity of IO is often the cause of needless friction in … Continue reading Information Operations: Marketing for War
“The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” Thucydides[1] Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian Waris generally acknowledged to be an outstanding example of military historiography. The text is an enthralling yet challenging account of the catastrophic impact of the 27-year war between Athens and Sparta during the 5th Century BC. … Continue reading Just War Theory in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War
On 22nd June 1941, the Russian military was in disarray as Germany embarked upon the largest military campaign the world had ever seen; Operation Barbarossa. Tactically, the Red Army was woefully unprepared, but a robust Soviet strategic and ideological framework was in place to leverage off the concept of total national mobilisation. Russia’s ruthless approach … Continue reading Countering Mass as a Middle Power: A Case Study
In late 1938 Europe stood on the brink of war. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain received a hero’s welcome on his return from Munich. His efforts to save the peace in Europe were greeted by fanfare and relief. Intent on preserving peace in Europe, Chamberlain had made all allowable concessions to Hitler. He was convinced … Continue reading The Risk of Appeasement to Relative Power
Without humans, war would be a relatively straight-forward affair. Thucydides explores the dynamics of human interaction in his account of the Peloponnesian War; both how humans affect, and are affected by war. He presents us with a number of key propositions about war and human nature, perhaps most strikingly, the motives for war; “fear, honour, … Continue reading Thucydides and the Inseparable Union of War and Human Nature
